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WHAT TO EXPECT WHEN TRADING 
WITH THE U.S.S.R.: THE PRQBLEMS 
CONFRONTING THE AMERICAN EXPORTER 
INTRODUCTION 
The Trade Agreement, 1 signed in October 1972, contemplates a 
threefold increase in U.S.-Soviet trade to take place over the next three 
years. The minimum aggregate amount of this trade is expected to be 
about $1.5 billion. Some American corporations have already negotiated 
and secured contracts with Soviet foreign trade organizations, while 
others have made initial contacts with the Soviets and are discussing 
future projects. 
This article is designed to prepare the American exporter for what 
he will encounter in dealings with the Russians. United States foreign 
trade legislation is discussed briefly. The specific provisions that apply 
in each particular -case are complex, and are beyond the scope of this 
article. The Soviet framework for conducting foreign trade is outlined, 
with emphasis placed on the foreign trade organizations. Policy consid-
erations are also discussed because the Soviet Union conducts foreign 
trade in order to achieve goals different from the customary goals of a 
free market economy. 
Finally, the problems that often arise in trading with the Russians 
are discussed from the viewpoint of the American as the seller. This 
section is especially important because the key to securing a profitable 
agreement is preparation by the American firm. Relevant to this section 
is the current status of the Trade Reform Bill (H.R. 10710). Two "anti-
Soviet" amendments have been attached to the bill by the House of 
Representatives. Senate passage of the legislation, with amendments 
identical to those added by the House, could lead to the demise of U.S.-
Soviet trade. 2 Special emphasis is also given to the problems that may 
arise in the course of negotiating a contract with the Russians. 
I. UNITED STATES LEGISLATION AND POLICY 
United States regulations on trade with the Soviet Union are both 
1. Aweement with the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Re-
1-{ardin!-{ Trade, Oct. 18, 1972, in U.S.-SOVIET COMMERCIAL AGREEMENTS 1972 88-91 (1973) 
I hereinafter cited as Trade Apreementl. For a summary of the Trade Agreement, see 
Olfice of the White House Press Secretary, "Fact Sheet-Trade Agreement, Lend Lease 
S ettlem ent, Reciprocal Credit Arrangements Joint U.S.-U.S.S.R. Commercial Commis-
sfon," Oct. 18, 1972, in U.S.-SOVIET COMMERCIAL AGREEMENTS 1972 75-87 (1973) 
I hereinafter cited as COMMERCIAL AGREEMENTS]. 
2. See notes 122-27 infra and accompanying text. 
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voluminous and complex. It is possible that there will be major changes 
in U.S. foreign trade legislation prior to the end of 1974.3 Nonetheless, 
this section examines and analyzes the current legislation. The Ameri-
can businessman is cautioned, however, to make a complete investiga-
tion of the statutes that affect his particular commodity prior to negoti-
ating with the Soviet Union. 
United States export legislation regulating U .S.-Soviet trade can be 
divided into two general categories: Export Controls and Credit Con-
trols. 
A. Export Controls 
Prior to 1969, the Export Control Act of 19494 regulated exports. In 
1969, however, the Export Administration Act5 superseded the older 
Act, although only minor changes were made. Under both the Export 
Control Act and the current Export Administration Act every export of 
commodities or technical information from the United States to any 
other country of the world (with the general exception of Canada6) re-
quires an export license. 7 
The purposes of the 1969 enactment are essentially the same as its 
predecessor's.8 Congress declared that: 
It is the policy of the United States to use export controls (A) to the 
extent necessary to protect the domestic economy from the excessive 
drain of scarce materials and to reduce the serious inflationary impact 
of abnormal foreign demand, (B) to the extent necessary to further 
3. See notes 127 -30 infra and accompanying text. 
4. Act of Feb. 26, 1949, ch. 11, 63 Stat. 7, as amended, 76 Stat. 127 (1962), and 79 
Stat. 209 (1965). 
5. Export Administration Act of Dec. 30, 1969, 50 U.S.C.A. App. §§ 2401-13 (Supp. 
1970-71). 
6. s. PISAR, COEXISTENCE & COMMERCE 120 (1970) [hereinafter cited as PISAR]. 
7. See 1tenerally 15 C.F.R. §§ 368-99 (1973). Other rules besides the Export Control 
Regulations govern the export of specialized goods and data such as: arms, ammunition, 
implements of war and related technical data; nuclear source materials, facilities, and 
related technology; gold; narcotics and marijuana; certain agricultural commodities; ves-
sels; and natural gas and electric energy. For the ~pecific provisions governing the export 
of these items, see Hoya, The Changing U.S. Regulation of East-West Trade, 12 CoLUM. 
J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1, 6-7 n.30 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Hoya]. 
8. The definition of policy in the 1969 Act differs from the policy stated in the 1949 
Act in two respects. First, Congress declared as U.S. policy the encouragement of trade 
with all countries with which the United States has diplomatic or trading relations. 
Second, the policy of the 1949 Act was to deny an export license for exportation of any 
commodity or technical data to any European or Soviet country that would contribute 
significantly to their military or economic potential in a way that would be detrimental 
to the security or welfare of the United States. The current Act removes the "economic 
potential" restriction. J. GIFFEN, THE LEGAL AND PRACTICAL ASPECTS OF TRADE WITH THE 
SovrnT UNION 102-03 (1971) [hereinafter cited as GIFFEN]. 
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significantly the foreign policy of the United States and to fulfill its 
international responsibilities, and (C) to the extent necessary to exer-
cise the necessary vigilance over exports from the standpoint of their 
significance to the national security of the United States.9 
21 
The export controls also apply to all goods and technology that could 
make a significant contribution to the military potential of any other 
nation. 10 It is clear that national security is the motivating factor in the 
restriction of exports. 
The Act vests the organizational power to implement these controls 
in the Secretary of Commerce. 11 In order to effectively regulate exports, 
a licensing system was established. There are two types of export licen-
ses: a general license and a validated license. The availability of an 
export license for a particular item depends on both the type of goods 
to be exported and the country of destination. 
1. GENERAL LICENSE 
A great number of goods on the United States Commodity Control 
List may be exported to Eastern Europe without the filing of an applica-
tion by the exporter or the issuance of a license document by the Com-
merce Department. 12 These commodities are exported under what is 
termed the "general license." Although the general license is really no 
license at all, the Commerce Department has perpetuated this fiction 
in order to impress upon exporters the fact that exporting is a privilege 
that may be revoked or suspended pursuant to the regulations and deci-
sions promulgated by the Department. 13 Currently there are fourteen 
classes of general licenses. 14 
In addition to commodity controls, there are licenses for "technical 
data." 15 The regulations establish two broad classes of technical infor-
mation. The first is unclassified, scientific, and educational technical 
data, defined as all that information not directly or significantly related 
9. 50 U.S.C.A. § 2402(2) (Supp. 1972). 
10. Id. § 2402(1)(B) (Supp. 1972). 
11. Id . § 2403 (Supp. 1972). 
12. Hoya, supra note 7, at 7; McQuade, U.S. Trade with Eastern Europe: Its Pros-
pects and Parameters, 3 LAW & PoL. INT'L Bus. 42, 76 (1971) [hereinafter cited as 
McQuadel. 
13. GIFFEN, supra note 8, at 18. 
14. 15 C.F.R. §§ 371.7-.20 (1973). 
15. Technical data is defined by the regulations as: 
information of any kind that can be used, or adapted for use, in the design, 
production, manufacture, utilization, or reconstruction of articles or materials. 
The data rriay take a tangible form, such as a model, prototype, blueprint, or 
an operating manual; or they may take an intangible form such as technical 
service. 
15 C.F.R. § 379.l(a) (1973). 
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to design, production or utilization in industrial processes or instruction 
in academic institutions or laboratories. 16 A general license designated 
GTDA is used for such information and can be obtained for export to 
the Soviet Union. If the information does not come within the definition 
set out above, another license must be sought. Although there are two 
general licenses available for "other" information, only one is available 
for exports to the U.S.S.R. If the information is in published form, 17 the 
general license GTDR may be available. If the information does not fit 
into one of the categories of "published" data, a validated license18 must 
be obtained. 
2. VALIDATED LICENSE 
If a particular item is not exportable to the Soviet Union under a 
general license, a validated license must be obtained. A validated li-
cense differs from a general license in one major respect: where the 
general license was a mere right not represented by any tangible instru-
ment, the validated license is a right coupled with, and incorporated 
within a written instrument. 19 There are currently six classifications of 
validated licenses. 20 
With certain exceptions, such as for short-supply controls, 21 the 
requirement for a validated license is intended to cover only those cate-
gories of goods or technology with enough potential for military or stra-
tegic use to warrant Government review before export. 22 
Technical data are controlled in substantially the same manner as 
commodities. Any technical information not exportable under a general 
license requires a validated license.23 
There are a variety of other regulations and requirements applica-
ble to the export of commodities and technical data. The potential 
exporter should consult the Department of Commerce Export Regula-
tions and Commodity Control List to determine exactly how they apply 
to each particular situation.24 
16. Id. §§ 379(3)(a), (b) (1973) . 
17. Id. 
18. See notes 19-24 infra and accompanying text. 
19. 15 C.F.R. § 372.2(a) (1973). 
20. Id. §§ 372.2(b)(l)-(6) (1973). 
21. Id. § 377 (1973). 
22. McQuade, supra note 12, at 77; Hoya, supra note 7, at 7. The main categories of 
items restricted to exportation under a validated license are: some metals and alloys and 
specialized manufactures thereof; specified groups of chemicals, plastics, petroleum prod-
ucts, synthetic rubbers, and manufactures; some highly specialized kinds of machines and 
machinery, scientific and control instruments, photographic and optical goods; aircraft; 
some military types of vehicles, and railway cars; and a few items used in the production 
of arms and ammunition. 
23. 15 C.F.R. §§ 379.4-.6 (1973) . 
24. General Export Regulations are found in 15 C.F.R. §§ 368-399 (1973). The Com-
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3. CRITERIA USED IN DETERMINATION OF LICENSE APPLICATIONS 
Although the Export Administration Act liberalized trade restric-
tions applying to the Soviet Union, there remain certain strategic goods 
that cannot be exported.25 Obviously for any denial of strategic exports 
to Communist countries to be effective, there must be a concerted effort 
on behalf of all Western industrialized countries to prohibit the trade 
of certain commodities. To this end, a multilateral organization was 
established in 1949 known as COCOM.26 Today, COCOM includes all 
the NATO countries except Iceland, plus Japan~27 The COCOM coun-
tries agree to embargo the export of specific strategic items to all Euro-
pean and Asian countries (except Yugoslavia) under Communist con-
trol. The controls of COCOM apply to the export of about 550 categories 
of goods and products including: arms, ammunition and implements of 
war, atomic materials and facilities, and other strategic goods. 28 
COCOM controls are minimum restraints, and goods are periodically 
added to or subtracted from the list of restricted items. Because partici-
pation in COCOM is voluntary, and the restraints are minimal, coun-
tries are free to embargo additional items on an individual basis. In fact, 
the United States list of restricted goods is longer than COCOM's. 
There are several relevant factors in the determination of how a 
commodity should be regulated under the U.S. export controls. Some 
of the questions asked are: 
1. Is the commodity designed for, principally used for, intended for, 
or could it be applied to, a significant military use? 
2. Does it contain unique or advanced technology that is extractable? 
3. Would it promote the military-industrial base of the country of 
destination? 
4. Would it contribute to the economy of the Communist countries to 
the detriment of our own security? 
5. Are there adequate supplies of good substitutes available elsewhere 
that would make control by the United States futile? 
6. Are the quantities and types of equipment normal for the proposed 
use? 
7. Is the equipment an integral part of a larger package (such as the 
Fiat plant built in the U.S.S.R.), and therefore, unlikely to be used 
for other than the stated purposes?29 
modity Control List is in 15 C.F.R. § 399 (1973). 
25. See notes 26-39 infra and accompanying text. 
26. The Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act of 1951 (Battle Act), § 301, as 
am ended, 22 U.S.C. §§ 1611-13d (1964) authorizes United States participation in the 
International Coordinating Committee (COCOM). See also McQuade, supra note 12, at 
72 n.111 ; Hoya, supra note 7, at 8-9. 
27. McQuade, supra note 12, at 52 n.38. 
28. Id. at 72. 
29. Hearin!{s on East-West Trade Before the Subcomm. on lnt'l Finance of the Sen-
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The foreign availability of an item "is one of the more important 
facts taken into account in a licensing judgment. " 30 In practice, the 
foreign availability test is difficult to apply, because of problems origi-
nating with basic interpretation.31 
Another problem of the foreign availability criterion is that reliable 
facts are sometimes difficult to accumulate. Intelligence sources can 
often supply the information from non-Communist sources who may 
have sold or produced the product/technology in question. Sometimes, 
however, the only reliable information is held by the Eastern countries, 
and this presents both a difficult and potentially embarassing situation 
for information gatherers. 32 
There are arguments both in favor of and in opposition to a more 
liberal United States trade policy.33 During 1970-71 the Administration 
eased the licensing requirements for over 1700 commodities. 34 Nonethe-
less, the fact that the government frustrated attempts by the Soviets to 
purchase an automobile factory to be constructed in the U.S.S.R. by 
Ford Motor Co. indicates that national security retains vitality in the 
final determination of an export application. 35 
B. Credit Controls 
One of the greatest problems in U.S.-Soviet trade, prior to 1972, was 
credit. Because the Soviets do not have vast foreign currency reserves, 36 
ate Hankin!{ and Currency Comm. , 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 223-24 (1968) (testimony of 
Lawrence McQuade, then Assistant Secretary for Domestic and International Business of 
the Department of Commerce) . 
:m. Id. at 223 . Until 1967, an application to export a particular good might have been 
rejected because of its potential contribution to the general economy of an Eastern coun-
try . This criterion was dropped, however, as the more liberal Export Administration Act 
replaced the old legislation. 
31. The following example is taken from McQuade, supra note 12, at 89-90. For 
example, does the term " foreign availability" mean that comparable items might be 
purchased or actually have been purchased? Another dilemma exists when limited quanti-
ties of an item deemed strategic by the United States are available from other non -
Communist sources. Still another question arises in regard to products or technology 
available to the Soviet Union from other sources which will produce similar, but not 
exactly the same, results as an American product or technology deemed strategic by the 
United States, but the foreign item is more expensive, less reliable, less efficient, possesses 
potentially troublesome side-effects, or is generally less sophisticated. 
32. For a more detailed discussion, see McQuade, supra note 12, at 90-91. 
33. S ee Hoya, supra note 7, at 9-11; McQuade, supra note 12, at 91-3. 
34. Hoya, supra note 7, at 10. 
35. N.Y. Times, May 15, 1970, at 1, col. 2. 
36. The inadequacy of Soviet foreign currency reserves necessitated their selling $250 
million in gold on the gold market in order to pay for the wheat purchased from the United 
States in 1972. See Farrell, Soviet Pay ments Problems in Trade with the West, in SOVIET 
ECONOMIC PROSPECTS FOR THE SEVENTIES-A COMPENDIUM OF PAPERS SUBMITTED TO THE 
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and the ruble is not convertible, 37 they prefer to include provisions for 
long-term credit extensions in most of their foreign trade agreements, 
especially those involving long-term, expensive projects (such as turn-
key plants38). Until recently the United States corporations were se-
verely limited in their negotiations with the Soviets because the govern-
ment would not allow the extension of long-term credits to Communist 
countries. 39 
The Export-Import Bank is the primary source of credit for United 
States international trade. From 1968 to August 1971, the Export-
Import Bank was precluded from financing exports to all Communist 
countries except Yugoslavia. 40 Not subject to exception by Presidential 
determination, this blanket prohibition applied to any country whose 
government supplied goods or assistance to a country engaged in armed 
conflict with United States armed forces. 41 Congress repealed this prohi-
bition in 1971, 42 however, thereby reinstating an earlier prohibition 
against Export-Import Bank participation in transactions involving 
Communist countries. 43 This restriction is vastly different from the one 
repealed, in that a Presidential determination that the extension of 
credit is in the national interest waives the ban. This relaxation of credit 
control by Congress paved the way for President Nixon to make the 
determination that trade with the Soviet Union is in the national inter-
est. This was done on October 18, 1972,44 coincidentally the date of the 
signing of the U.S.-Soviet Trade Agreement. 45 
Regulations concerning the Export-Import Bank are not the only 
credit limitations on U .S.-Soviet trade. The Johnson Debt Default Act 
.JotNT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 690, 694 (1973) [hereinafter cited as 
SoVIF,T ECONOMIC PROSPECTS!. It is important to note, however, that the U.S.S.R. main-
tains vast reserves of platinum and gold, both of which can be converted to hard currency 
on the foreign exchange markets. 
:n. The Soviet government maintains a policy of not allowing the ruble to be traded 
on international money markets. Thus, it has no value outside the Soviet Union. 
38. The phrase " turn-key plant" is used to refer to Soviet importation of an entire 
technology-including physical plant, machinery, parts, technical "know-how" and train-
ing . See note 160 infra and accompanying text. 
:39. Export-Import Bank Act of 1945 § 2(b)(3), Pub. L. No. 90-267, § l(c), 82 Stat. 
47 (1968), as amended, 12 U.S.C.A. § 635(b)(2) (1957), as amended, (Supp. 1972). 
40. Hoya , supra note 7, at 11. 
41. Export-Import Bank Act of 1945 § 2(b)(3), Pub. L. No. 90-267, § l(c), 82 Stat. 
47 (1968) , as amended, 12 U.S.C.A. § 635(b)(2) (1957), as amended, (Supp. 1972). 
42. Export Expansion Finance Act of 1971 § l(b)(5), Pub. L. No. 92-126, 85 Stat. 34.5 
( 1971) , am ending Export-Import Bank Act of 1945, § 2(b)(3), 12 U.S.C. § 635(b)(3) 
(1970) (codified at 12 U.S.C.A. § 635(b)(3) (1957), as amended, Supp. 1972). 
4:3. Export-Import Bank Act of 1945 § 2(b)(2), 12 U.S.C. § 631(b)(2) (1957), as 
am ended, (Supp . 1972). 
44 . Presidential Determination, Oct. 18, 1972, on file at the Export-Import Bank. 
45. See Trade Agreem ent, supra note 1. 
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of 193448 also restricts credits issued to the U .S.S.R. by private parties. 
The Act, as amended, provides, in part: 
Whoever, within the United States . . . makes any loan to such 
foreign government, political subdivision, organization or association 
. . . while such government . . . is in default in the payment of its 
obligations, or any part thereof, to the United States, shall be fined 
This section is applicable to individuals, partnerships, 
corporations, or associations other than public corporations created by 
or pursuant to special authorizations of Congress .... While any for-
eign government is a member both of the International Monetary Fund 
and of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 
this section shall not apply .... 47 
Because the U.S.S.R. is neither a member of the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) nor a member of the International Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development (World Bank), the Act applies. Furthermore, the 
U.S.S.R. owes the United States on both czarist and lend-lease debts. 48 
The situation is not as bad as it might appear, however, for two 
reasons. First, provision has been made for the Soviet Union to repay 
the lend-lease debt. 49 Second, the Johnson Act has been liberally 
construed as not covering an extension of normal commercial credit as 
part of a specific export transaction. 50 
Whereas the Johnson Debt Default Act has not served as a deter-
rent to U.S.-Soviet trade, shipping restrictions that required fifty per-
cent of all wheat and cereal grains exported to the Soviet Union to be 
carried on U.S. flag ocean carriers51 did have a significant effect because 
the cost of shipping in American vessels was substantially higher than 
in foreign ships.52 The Maritime Agreement signed in 1972 solves this 
problem by specifying that one-third of the trade will be carried by 
American vessels, one-third by Soviet ships, and one-third by third 
country carriers. 53 
46. Ch. 112, 48 Stat. 574 (1934), as amended, 18 U.S.C. § 955 (1970). 
47 . 18 u.s.c. § 955 (1970). 
48. See COMMERCIAL AGREEMENTS, supra note 1, at 82-83. The Czarist debts were 
assumed by the provisional government that took over power following the Russian Revo-
lution. Although international law requires the current government to repay these debts, 
the Soviet regime refuses to accept this responsibility. 
49. Aweement With the Government of the Unum of Soviet Socialist Republics Re-
f!ardinf! Settlement of Lend Lease, Reciprocal Aid and Claims, in U.S.-SOVIET COMMERCIAL 
Ar.REF.MENTS 1972 105-07 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Lend-Lease). 
50. McQuade, supra note 12, at 65; Hoya, supra note 7, at 13. 
51. 15 C.F.R. § 376.3 (1973). See also, Bilder, East-West Trade Boycotts: A Study 
in Private, Labor Union, State, and Local Interference with Foreign Policy, 118 U. PA. L. 
RF.v. 841, 873-78 (1970). 
52. N.Y. Times, June 11, 1971, at 1, col. 8; J. OF CoM., June 11, 1971, at 1, cols. 6-8; 
Wall St. J., ,June 11, 1971, at 3, col. l; Washington Post, June 11, 1971, at Al, col. 6. 
53. Aweement with the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Re-
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II. SOVIET STRUCTURE AND POLICY 
Any American businessman contemplating trade with the Soviet 
Union must also be familiar with the structure of the State-trading 
organizations with which he will be dealing. A thorough understanding 
of the internal Soviet framework for conducting international trade will 
place the American seller in a better position to identify and cope with 
the problems that invariably arise prior to the consummation of a 
contract. 54 Moreover, this understanding will enable the American nego-
tiator to comprehend the policy considerations which form the basis for 
the ultimate Soviet decision to enter (or not to enter) into a business 
agreement. 
A. Internal Organization 
There is a fundamental conceptual difference between the organiza-
tions that carry on trade in the United States and the Soviet Union. 
Whereas private commercial activity dominates United States trade, all 
Soviet ventures into foreign markets are made under the auspices of the 
State.55 In the Soviet Union, the State decides what merchandise will 
be bought, sold, bartered or dumped abroad. 56 The diagram below de-
picts the extent of control exerted by the State. 57 
PRESIDIUM 
CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF 
T HE COMM UNIST PARTY 
L. Brezhnev, Secretary -General 
COUNC IL OF MINIST ERS 
A. Kosygin , Premier N . Podgorny, President 
ALL-UNION CHAMBER 
OF COMMERCE 
F. Patent/frademark Reiist 
Arbitration 
STATE PLANNING COM MITTEE 
(GOSPLANI 
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN TRADE 
N. Patoli chev, Minister 
TWO •"IRST DEPUTY MI NIST ERS 
NINE DEPUTY MINISTERS 
Acti vities: Development of Ex p/Imp 
Plan11, lnternat. T rade Negot iations, 
Trade Policy Determinat ion, Financ., 
Coop. wi th Cou ncil for Mutua l Ee 
Ass. Di rection of Foreign Trade 
Corpora1ion11and Delegations 
MINISTRIES AND OTHER PUBUC 
AGBNCI ES INVOLVED IN FOREIGN 
COMM ERCE 
FI NANCE MI NISTRY 
MERCHA NTH\l lN ISTRY 
AGRICUL TIJRE MINISTRY 
INGOSSTA KH (Ovenieas ln11u rance) 
VNES HTORG BANK OF T HE U.S.S.R. 
Y. A. Ivanov, Chairman 
Moscow-Narodny Bank, Ltd ., London 
::=~~f~~i:t•~:.p;~~;~:rope, Paris 
Wosshod Ha ndelsb11nk AG., Zurich 
COMMITIEE ON SCIENCE AND T ECHNOLOGY 
LICENSINTORG OTH ERS (A pprox. 50) 
AMTO RG TRADI NG CORP. 
New York 
FOREIGN TRADE DELEGATIONS 
IN VARIOUS COUNTRI ES 
Various Wholly-and part ly.owned companies in capit alist countries 
!{ardin!-f Certain Maritim e Matt ers, Annex III, in U.S .-SOVIET COMMERCIAL AGREEMENTS 
1972 2:l-75 (1973). 
54. See notes 131-166 infra and accompanying text. 
55. PISAR, .mpra note 6, at 142; Berman, The Legal Framework of Trade B etween 
Planned and Mark et Economies: The Soviet-American Example, 24 L. & CoNTEMP. PROB. 
482 ( 191)8) I hereinafter cited as Berman]. 
56. PISAR, supra note 6, at 142. 
57. Copyright 1972. Reprinted from the November 1972 issue of The Business Law-
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Although this diagram appears, at first blush, to be extremely complex, 
this is not the case. The top halfof the diagram (those blocks above the 
Ministry of Foreign Trade) is primarily illustrative. The blocks repre-
senting the Supreme Soviet, the Central Committee, the Council of 
Ministers, the Presidium and GOSPLAN, are included in the diagram 
to illustrate the three principal characteristics that distinguish the So-
viet system of foreign trade from that of most other countries: first, that 
Soviet foreign trade is operated and administered by State agencies; 
second, that integrated national economic planning (organized by GOS-
PLAN) serves as the foundation on which all trade is conducted; and 
third, that the Communist Party heads the government which directs 
the economic planning.58 The bottom of the chart, the core of which is 
the Ministry of Foreign Trade, is of more concern to the prospective 
American seller. The parties with whom the American will have the 
most contact are represented in this part of the diagram. 
The Ministry of Foreign Trade, aided by other interested minis-
tries, 59 state committees,60 and the Soviet State Bank,61 prepares the 
final export-import plan which must correspond with the goals estab-
lished by GOS PLAN. 62 The Ministry of Foreign Trade has the adminis-
trative responsibility of putting the resultant plan into effect, 63 and to 
that end is divided up into a number of geographic and functional de-
partments that deal with the entire range of commercial relations with 
both Capitalist and Communist nations. 64 
As the chart indicates, the Ministry of Foreign Trade has direct 
control over each Foreign Trade Organization (FTO) and Foreign Trade 
Delegation. Each of these State agencies plays a distinct role in the 
furtherance of Soviet trade in foreign markets. The trade delegations 
appear on foreign markets as representatives of the Soviet State, and 
yer, with permission of the American Bar Association and its Section of Corporation, 
Banking and Business Law. It was originally contained in Nehemkis & Schollhammer, 
International Business Transactions with the Soviet Union and Mainland China: Pros-
pects and Hazards, 28 Bus. LAW. 17, 40 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Nehemkis & Scholl-
hammerl . 
58. Berman, supra note 55, at 483. See notes 86-92 infra and accompanying text. 
59. E.g. , ministries of Finance, Merchant Marine, and Agriculture. 
60. E. g., state committees for Science and Technology, Foreign Economic Relations, 
and State Security (K.G.B.). 
61. Nehemkis & Schollhammer, supra note 57, at 26. 
62 . Id. 
63. Berman, supra note 55, at 486. 
64. PISAR, supra note 6, at 143; Nehemkis & Schollhammer, supra note 57, at 26. 
Some of the more important functions of the departments within the Ministry are: 
negotiation of commercial treaties with other countries; regulation and administration 
of tariffs ; issuance of export and import licenses; and direction of official trade delegations 
and corporate instrumentalities authorized to engage in international commerce. See 
PISAR, supra note 6, at 143, for a more detailed list of these functions. 
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they serve as a component part of the diplomatic corps of the Soviet 
Union abroad. 65 Under Soviet law, the trade delegations are not legal 
entities, and therefore, cannot sue or be sued. Further, they are not 
responsible for their debts. 66 Because the trade delegations can, and 
often do, invoke the doctrine of sovereign immunity, the United States, 
with one exception, has forbidden them from entering American terri-
tory.67 
Because there is only one trade delegation in existence in the United 
States, its utility is severely limited. This is one reason why United 
States corporations have been slow to enter the Soviet market. Without 
access to reliable information on Soviet markets, American corporations 
are unable to adequately determine the needs of their potential pur-
chasers.68 
The problem of sovereign immunity is unique to the Soviet trade 
delegations and does not exist when American corporations deal 
with a Soviet FTO. 69 A Soviet FTO is a judicial person, and conse-
quently acquires rights in property in its own name, incurs obligations, 
and sues (and may be sued) in its own right.70 The FTO receives a 
charter enumerating its powers and the amount of its chartered capi-
tal.71 There are approximately 55 trade organizations, each one possess-
ing a monopoly of foreign trade transactions in a particular sphere of the 
economy.72 Not all trade organizations are empowered to engage in both 
the import and export of commodities; some are limited by their charter 
65 . Berman, supra note 55, at 486 . 
66. Id . 
67. Id. See also PISAR, supra note 6, at 96; Nehemkis & Schollhammer, supra note 
57, at '27. The sole exception to the American exclusion of the trade delegations is the 
Amtorg Trading Corporation. Amtorg is organized under the laws of the State of New 
York. Having its principal place of business in New York, Amtorg acts as an agent on 
behalf of Soviet enterprises. The basic functions of Amtorg are similar to those of the trade 
delegations established in other countries, and include: the issuance of import licenses, 
granting of permits for the transit of goods through Soviet territory, the delivery of certifi-
cates of origin, and the inducement of compliance with Soviet foreign trade regulations. 
Another important function of the trade delegations, in general, is to study local economic 
conditions, report on sales possibilities and aid local businesses by providing information 
relating to market potential within the Soviet Union. PISAR, supra, at 152. 
Although not foreign trade delegations per se, the trade representatives in Washing-
ton serve the same purpose. See note 132 infra and accompanying text. The Kama River 
Purchasing C«>mmission located in New York, deals exclusively with materials related to 
the Kama River project, and would be more akin to an FTO. See notes 69-72 infra and 
accompanying text. 
68. One solution to this problem would be the alteration of the trade delegation's 
right to claim sovereign immunity. For example, sovereign immunity could be made 
available as a defense only in limited situations. 
69. Berman, supra note 55, at 487; P1sAR, supra note 6, at 147. 
70. Berman, supra note 55, at 487 n.14. 
71. Id. at 487 n.16. 
7'2. Id. at 488. 
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to import goods only; others to export only. Still other FTO's may be 
chartered to deal in a wide range of products, but are confined to a 
specific geographic area. 73 
The American businessman must not lose sight of the fact that the 
FTO, although appearing to be autonomous, forms an integral part of 
the State monopoly of foreign trade. 74 In addition to the fact that some 
FTO's are housed in the same building that contains both the Ministry 
of Foreign Trade and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 75 the Minister of 
Foreign Trade appoints both the president and the vice-president of the 
trading organization. Thus, the chief executives of these State organs 
are subordinate to the Minister of Foreign Trade and are subject to 
disciplinary action taken by him. 76 
Another significant fact is that the trade organization, with whom 
the U.S. businessman is negotiating, is neither the manufacturer of the 
goods it sells, nor the user of the goods it purchases.77 The FTO is the 
middleman between the Soviet user and the foreign supplier. The FTOs 
are bona fide principals, having the power to enter into binding con-
tracts.78 The Soviet Union is not responsible for the FTO's debts, how-
ever, and as noted above, the FTO is not entitled to claim sovereign 
immunity. In the course of negotiations between the American business-
man and the FTO, the Soviet domestic enterprise which will use the 
commodities being discussed may assist in the negotiation of a particu-
lar contract, but nonetheless does not qualify as a party to it. 79 
The FTO is the entity with which the American businessman will 
deal. Each organization negotiates commercial transactions and makes 
purchases on the traditional criteria of price, quality, delivery terms, 
etc., and frequently attempts to arrange payment in the form of goods 
rather than foreign currency. 80 
The Soviet Union has made, and continues to make, attempts to 
adapt its internal structure to foreign trade. The existence of the All-
Union Chamber of Commerce represents one such attempt. It is similar 
to the chambers of commerce established by private traders in market 
economies. The primary responsibility of the Chamber of Commerce is 
to promote and facilitate international trade. 81 
7:l. A list of the FTO's is available from the Department of Commerce. 
74. PISAR, supra note 6, at 148; Berman, supra note 55, at 489; Nehemkis & Scholl-
hammer, supra note 57, at 29. 
75. Nehemkis & Schollhammer, supra note 57, at 29. 
76. Berman, supra note 55, at 489. 
77. PISAR, supra note 6, at 148; Nehemkis & Schollhammer, supra note 57, at 29. 
78. Id. 
79. PISAR, supra note 6, at 148. 
80. McQuade, supra note 12, at 53 . See notes 155-64 infra and accompanying text. 
81. S ee uenerally PISAR, supra note 6, at 145-47; Berman, supra note 55, at 492-96. 
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There are certain functions of the chambers that distinguish them 
from American chambers of commerce. In the U.S.S.R. the chambers 
also control the administration of the foreign patent and trademark 
registration system.82 More important than this, however, is the fact 
that the All-Union Chamber of Commerce controls the machinery used 
in the arbitration of international trade and maritime disputes. 83 Al-
though under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Foreign Trade, 84 the 
Soviet tribunals have acquired a reputation for fairness and impartial-
ity,85 and the Commissions' decisions indicate a thorough familiarity 
with the commercial law and customs of many countries. 
B. Foreign Trade Planning and the Policy Involved 
It is common knowledge that the Soviet Union is a highly 
structured state, with all levers of power in the hands of a select group 
of Party and government leaders. Over the years an intricate apparatus 
has been developed to control all activities designated to be in the public 
interest. The natural result of such a complex organization has been to 
reduce every aspect of national endeavor, both internal and external, to 
an integrated "plan,"86 which reflects the priorities prescribed by the 
governmental leaders. 
The national economic plan is developed by GOS PLAN, based on 
a list of priorities handed down from the upper echelons of the govern-
ment. This concept of a centrally-planned, command economy is con-
sidered superior to the spontaneous, "aimless" nature of a pure market 
economy.87 A national economic plan is the only viable way to achieve 
the ultimate goals of: 
The All-Union Chamber of Commerce is also a juridical person, with the right to acquire, 
alienate, and lease both movable and immovable property. The Chamber of Commerce 
is free to enter into binding contracts, and thus sue and be sued, but it is limited by its 
charter in respect to those activities it may pursue. 
In addition, the specific functions of the chambers include: establishment of perma-
nent relations with comparable foreign organizations; sponsorship of trade and industry 
fairs , at home and abroad; furnishirtg of marketing information; issuance of certificates 
of origin on exported goods; and certification of quality after examination of products; and 
promotion of joint ventures between local and alien firms. 
82. Berman, supra note 55, at 492; PISAR, supra note 6, at 145-46. Basically the 
chambers serve as the foreign party's "agent" or representative in registering the patent 
or trademark with the State Committee on Inventions and Discoveries which actually 
administers the patent and trademark registration system. 
8 :~. Two specialized tribunals, the Foreign Trade Arbitration Commission and the 
Maritime Arbitration Commission, are maintained for the specific purpose of adjudicating 
disputes. 
84. Berman, supra note 55, at 492-93. 
8G. Id. 
86. S ee J{enerally PISAR, supra note 6, at 154-60. 
87 . Id. at 155; Berman, supra note 55, at 496. 
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a) guaranteeing the independence of the development of the national 
economy, b) the victory . . . of the socialist system of economy and the 
gradual transition to communism, c) the rejection of disproportions in 
the national economy and the creation of necessary reserves for the 
struggle against such disproportions. 88 
With these long range goals in mind, the Soviet Union looks to the world 
market to fulfill three major goals. First, the world market is a supple-
mentary source of supply to overcome deficiencies in current operative 
State plans in production or over-all planning.8D Second, the world mar-
ket affords an opportunity to acquire capital goods. This takes the form 
of importation of sophisticated technology, and lessens the amount of 
investment needed to develop similar technology. Do Third, the foreign 
markets allow the Soviet Union to obtain foreign currency through the 
exportation of its own products. This currency build-up facilitates the 
importation of commodities which can only be obtained on a cash-sale 
basis. The fact that the ruble is not a convertible currency makes it even 
more imperative that the Soviet Union acquire foreign currency. 
These policies and concepts are clearly reflected in the foreign trade 
plans. The process begins with general instructions (enunciating the 
broad annual goals to be attained) from GOSPLAN to the Ministry of 
Foreign Trade.D• In the case of the import plan, GOSPLAN surveys the 
needs of the Soviet economy for foreign goods, paying particular atten-
tion to productive equipment and technology. To facilitate this process, 
domestic manufacturers and consumer enterprises submit applications 
to GOS PLAN, requesting certain items. A further investigation of exist-
ing domestic production levels is conducted, the results being incorpo-
rated into a balance sheet showing the estimated output and anticipated 
need for each major product. An attempt is made to compare domestic 
production costs with importation costs.D2 Once this process is com-
pleted, a provisional import plan is drafted. The Ministry of Foreign 
Trade then prepares its own schedules and consults with the various 
trade enterprises under its jurisdiction. Eventually, a revised plan is 
submitted to GOSPLAN and the Council of Ministers for ratification.D3 
It is on the basis of this plan that the trade organizations seek suppliers 
in order to fulfill their obligations. 
88. A.M. SMIRNOV AND N.N. LIUBIMOV (eds.), VNESHNIAIA ToRGOVLIA SSSR FOREIGN 
TRAOF. OF THF. U.S.S.R. 9, 17, 18 (1954). 
89. Nehemkis & Schollhammer, supra note 57, at 25. The wheat deals of 1963 and 
1972 are prime examples. 
90. Id. See also Berman, supra note 55, at 497. 
91. See PISAR, supra note 6, at 156-60. 
92 . This is made difficult because the Soviet pricing system is artificial, and the 
foreign currency markets are in a constant state of flux. 
9:t PISAR, supra note 6, at 157. 
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C. The Attraction of the United States as a Trading Partner 
The long standing Soviet policy of rejecting trade with the West as 
antithetical to the Communist _ideology is gradually being laid to rest. 
According to the Directives of the 23rd Congress of the Communist 
Party of the Soviet Union, the trading agencies should strive toward 
improving the import structure of Soviet trade by selecting for procure-
ment such types of raw materials, commodities and finished goods as 
involve higher current costs and capital investments when produced 
within the country. 94 
In fact, from 1965 to 1971, Soviet imports from Western countries95 
increased from $1.6 billion to $2.86 billion. Likewise, Soviet exports to 
the West rose from $1.438 billion to $2.71 billion during the same pe-
riod.96 Whereas Great Britain and Finland had ranked as the Soviet 
Union's foremost Western trading partners prior to 1970, Japan has 
assumed that position since 1970. 
The two main objectives of Soviet trade, to fill the numerous bare 
patches on the industrial horizon, and to catch up with the scale of 
output already achieved by the major economies of the West, 97 obviously 
limit the countries with which the Soviet Union can trade effectively. 
This is reflected in the fact that since 1968 about forty percent of all 
Soviet imports from the West have fallen in the category of "machinery 
and equipment. " 98 
The forms of industrial cooperation through which the Soviet Union 
attains its foreign trade goals vary. Key factors include: political consid-
erations, the amount of trade conducted in the past, and the type of 
venture contemplated. The first step in the approach toward Western 
markets has generally taken the form of an intergovernmental agree-
ment. These intergovernmental agreements cover economic, scientific 
and technological cooperation, and lay the basic framework within 
which to increase collaboration and set the stage for detailed agree-
ments.99 The Agreement on the Establishment of the Joint U.S.-Soviet 
Commercial Commission, the Trade Agreement, and the Agreement on 
the Establishment of a U.S.-U.S.S.R. Joint Commission on Scientific 
and Technological Cooperation, 100 all signed in 1972, are examples of 
94. Izvestia, April 10, 1966 (in Russian) . 
95. P. PETERSON, U.S.-SOVIET COMMERCIAL RELATIONS IN A NEW ERA 75 (1972) 
[hereinafter cited as PETERSON]. Those countries considered Western are: Japan, United 
Kingdom, West Germany, Finland, Italy, France, United States, and Canada. 
96. Id. at 74. 
97. P1sAR, supra note 6, at 34. 
98. PETERSON, supra note 95, at 76. 
99. Yalowitz, U.S. S. R. -Western Industrial Cooperation, in SovIET ECONOMIC PRos-
PF.CTS 712, 713 (1973). 
100. See COMMERCIAL AGREEMENTS, supra note 1, at 1; SovIET ECONOMIC PROSPECTS, 
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this form of intergovernmental agreement. 
A slight variant on this approach is the formation of cooperation 
agreements between major American businesses and the U.S.S.R. State 
Committee for Science and Technology .101 An agreement of this kind 
calls for the exchange of specialists and information, joint research pro-
grams, purchases of equipment and technology and licenses for 
production processes. Several United States firms have concluded 
agreements of this kind in the past two years. 102 
A more conventional form of cooperation is the conclusion of licens-
ing agreements and the importation of whole factories or processes. 103 
Often incorporated into this type of agreement is a provision for the 
marketing of the end product, to be conducted by the Western firm. 104 
Another method of industrial cooperation is specifically designed to 
facilitate exports to Western markets, in addition to bolstering the 
U.S.S.R.'s industrial capacity. One way to achieve this is the formation 
of joint or wholly owned companies outside the U.S.S.R. Although there 
are approximately thirty of these companies in various countries around 
the world, 105 there are no such enterprises within the United States. 
Production-sharing is a variation on this approach which involves par-
tial manufacturing or assembly in the Soviet Union, and marketing by 
a Wes tern trading partner. 106 
Another form of agreement utilized by the Soviet Union is one 
where the United States trading partner provides equipment and tech-
nology on credit for an industrial plant in the U.S.S.R., but no equity 
or supervisory rights are retained by the U.S. corporation. 107 Repayment 
of principal and interest is in products from the installation at pre-
arranged prices. The prices would be set so as to guarantee a profit for 
the U.S. partner on the original investment. 108 
Probably the best known and potentially most significant form of 
industrial cooperation relates to natural resources development projects 
in Siberia and the Far East. 109 Ordinarily the Western firm supplies 
technology and equipment on credit. Repayment is in product "at pre-
arranged prices" deferred until the project is completed and in produc-
supra note 99, at 714. 
101. SOVIET ECONOMIC PROSPECTS, supra note 99, at 714. 
102. Several American firms, including General Electric, American Can and Occi-
dental Petroleum, have concluded such agreements. 
1m. See note 160 infra and accompanying text. 
104. SOVIET ECONOMIC PROSPECTS, supra note 99, at 714. 
lOG. Id. 
lOH. Id. 
107. Id.; Nehemkis & Schollhammer, supra note 57, at 20. 
108. SOVIET ECONOMIC PROSPECTS, supra note 99, at 714-15. 
109. Id. 
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tion. Sometimes supply contracts are negotiated following the repay-
ment of the original credit extension. The immensity of these projects 
is remarkable, with deals ranging in value from $190 million 110 to $1.2 
billion111 already in progress. 
With the knowledge of the forms of industrial cooperation preferred 
by the Soviet Union, it is possible to predict what the Soviets will 
request at the negotiating table. Generally the U.S.S.R. expects the 
Western firm to supply the capital, technology, engineering, marketing, 
and management training, all without any ownership rights, in return 
for cash and payment in kind when the installation (a turn-key plant, 
for example) is in operation. In addition, the U.S.S.R. contributes labor, 
raw materials, basic plant facilities, and various other locally available 
elements. 112 Under this kind of arrangement the Western partner can 
purchase finished goods at a price well below what would have been its 
own cost of manufacture. Similarly, payment in kind involves less de-
pletion of foreign currency reserves held by the Soviet Union. In addi-
tion, the U.S.S.R. is assured of access to markets which might not have 
been available otherwise. 113 
An examination of both the Soviet and U.S. economies provides an 
insight into the kinds of deals that are more readily negotiable. 114 While 
the Soviet Union has maintained an average, real growth rate (in terms 
of GNP) of approximately 5.8 percent since 1950, as compared to about 
3.8 percent for the United States, 115 the Gross National Product of the 
Soviet Union is only one-half that of the United States. 116 This figure is 
more startling when it is considered that although 33 percent of the 
Russian GNP is investment, the level of technological development in 
the U.S.S.R. is only about 45 percent, relative to the United States. 117 
Irrespective of the fact that the Soviet economy has certain weak-
nesses, the most notable being consumer goods, the Soviet Union has 
certain strengths upon which the United States can draw. Metal pro-
duction in th~ Soviet Union, including titanium, chromite, manganese 
ore, iron ore, nickel, and bauxite, 118 far surpasses that of the United 
States. In addition, the Soviet Union has vast natural gas resources that 
110 .• Japan is supplying $190 million in timber-production equipment in return for 
timber and wood chips. 
111. Western European nations are supplying large diameter steel pipe in return for 
long-term natural gas deliveries. 
112. PISAR, supra note 6, at 39; Nehemkis & Schollhammer, supra note 57, at 20-21. 
11:1 . PISAR, supra note 6, at 39. 
114. For a more detailed discussion, see PETERSON, supra note 95. 
l lG. Id. at 28. 
116. Id. at :m. 
117./d.at.58. 
118. Id. at 60. 
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have been untapped until very recently. Platinum, needed in U.S. pro-
duction of automobile emission controls, is in short supply in the U.S., 
but plentiful in the Soviet Union. Gem diamonds and timber are also 
commodities that are marketable in the West. 119 The United States, on 
the other hand, is strong in the general areas of chemicals, agricultural 
production, consumer goods, and technology .120 
Possibly the most important aspect of the problem is the fact that 
because the United States is more advanced, in a technological sense, 
the U.S. corporations have a superior bargaining position, not only in 
relation to the Soviets, but also in relation to the rest of the developed 
West. This lever can be used effectively since the Soviets are now realiz-
ing that to maintain their great pow~r status in the world, where indices 
of power are increasingly economic, they must implant large amounts 
of foreign technology directly into their economy. This can be 
accomplished through one-time, know-how arrangements and one-time, 
turn-key plants, in addition to long-term joint projects. However, com-
plex technology is constantly changing-new means of achieving the end 
result at less cost are found all the time. Advanced technology takes 
time to be developed. 121 It is in the joint, long-term research and devel-
opment projects that both the U.S.S.R. and the American corporation 
can profit. The Soviets do not want to purchase equipment that will be 
outdated in a few years. Likewise, the American corporation will find 
that the Soviets have the ability to develop and apply sophisticated 
techniques, given the proper foundation. It is with these realizations in 
mind that the American corporation will discover the U.S.S.R. to be 
both a compatible and profitable trading partner in the future. 
III. CURRENT PROBLEMS CONFRONTING AMERICAN 
SELLERS 
The first two sections of this article outlined the general framework 
through which the United States and the Soviet Union conduct their 
foreign trade. The existence of trade contracts between United States 
corporations and the Soviet Union reflects the fact that the differences 
in the two governments' policies are reconcilable. In order to facilitate 
the negotiation of future deals, and in a spirit of mutual cooperation, 
the Trade Agreement of 1972 was signed by then Secretary of Commerce 
Peterson and N.S. Patolichev, the Soviet Minister of Foreign Trade. 
The Trade Agreement, and the Lend-Lease Settlement signed on 
the same date, do not represent a solution to all of the problems that 
arise in U.S.-Soviet trade. In fact, new problems, not contemplated at 
the time the agreements were negotiated, have arisen that could sub-
119. Id. See also id. at 76, 77 . 
120. Id . at. 76. 
121. Id . at 10. 
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stantially impair Soviet-American trade in the future. In addition to the 
legislative problems, however, the American businessman must also be 
equipped to cope with those issues that arise during actual contract 
negotiations. Both dilemmas ate explored in this section. 
A. Problems Posed by Congress 
The signing of both the Trade Agreement and the Lend-Lease Set-
tlement in October, 1972, represented a bona fide effort on the part of 
both countries to encourage Soviet-American trade. This form of bilat-
eral agreement is usually the first step taken by the Soviets in widening 
trade relations with foreign countries. For President Nixon it was a 
marked reversal of his anti-Communist attitude of the fifties. Nonethe-
less Congress seized upon the Agreement, and the promises contained 
therein, in an attempt to alter Soviet emigration laws. 
Article 1 of the Trade Agreement specifies that: 
Each country shall accord unconditionally to products originating in or 
exported to the other country treatment no less favorable than that 
accorded to like products originating in or exported to any third coun-
try in all matters . ... 122 
In other words, most-favored-nation (MFN) treatment was pledged to 
the .Soviets. This pledge is important for two reasons. First, it is contem-
plated that the Trade Amendment, to run for three years unless ex-
tended by mutual agreement, will not enter into force until the MFN 
legislation is passed. 123 Second, and equally important, is the fact that 
$674 million (out of a total amount due of $722 million) to be repaid 
under the Lend-Lease Settlement will not be due until the MFN legisla-
tion is passed. 124 Thus, the granting of most-favored-nation treatment 
forms an integral part of both U.S.-Soviet agreements. 
At the time of the signing of the agreements neither side contem-
plated any problems relating to MFN. The Congress, however, appears 
to be on the verge of rendering both agreements meaningless. The House 
of Representatives, in passing H.R. 10710 (Trade Reform Bill), attached 
two amendments proposed by Charles A. Vanik (D. Ohio). The first 
amendment to the Bill, passed by a 319-80 vote, forbids government-
122. Trade Agreement, supra note 1, arts. 1, 2. Technically, the Trade Agreement 
will not enter into force until an exchange of written notice of acceptance takes place. The 
exchange of notices, of course, will not occur until MFN is granted. 
12:1. COMMERCIAL AGREEMENTS, supra note 1, at 76. The author would like to express 
his thanks to Daniel D. Stein, Bureau of East-West Trade, Department of Commerce, for 
his aid in conceptualizing the problems presented in Part III of this paper. The views 
presented herein do not represent Mr. Stein's, nor are they a reflection of the Department 
of Commerce position. 
124 . Lend-Lease, supm note 49, at 4(b)(ii). 
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backed trade credits to the Soviet Union unless the Soviet government 
eases its restrictive emigration policies. 125 In fact, no Government-
backed, i.e., Export-Import Bank, credits could be extended to a Com-
munist nation if the President found that its government denied the 
right to emigrate or imposed more than nominal fees or taxes on citizens 
who wished to emigrate. 126 The second amendment would deny most-
favored-nation status for trade to any Communist nation not allowing 
free emigration. 127 It is a well-known fact, of course, that the Soviet 
Union does not allow free emigration. Although this legislation has to 
go to the Senate for passage before becoming law (the President has 
made clear his intention to sign the bill into law regardless of the anti-
Soviet amendments), the Vanik proposals seem certain to win approval 
in the Senate, where a majority of Senators have endorsed a similar set 
of amendments introduced by Senator Henry M. Jackson (D. Wash.). 128 
There is still hope, however, that the Senate version will be differ-
ent enough to send the bill back to conference, where a compromise 
could be worked out on the Soviet trade provisions. A possible solution 
would be to allow the President to make a determination that a Com-
munist government was "making progress" in its efforts to allow free 
emigration. 129 Congress would probably reserve the power to revoke any 
loosening of current restraints on U.S.-Soviet trade, if it disagreed with 
the President's determination on the easing of emigration restrictions. 130 
12G. CONGRESSIONAL Q., WEEKLY REP., vol. xxxi, No. 50, at 3~56 (Dec. 15, 1973). 
126. Id. at :1320. 
127. Id. 
128. Id . at 3256. 
129. Id. at 3257. 
1:m. The issue of most-favored-nation treatment for the Soviet Union has elicited 
many arguments both for and against the expansion of U.S.-Soviet trade. Those favoring 
the expansion of U.S.-Soviet trade maintain that the United States would benefit econom-
ically on the basis of comparative advantage principles. More important is the argument 
that history shows that trading with each other improves the relations between the peoples 
of different. countries. PISAR, supra note 6, emphasizes this point throughout his book. On 
the other hand, American opponents of U.S.-Soviet trade take a more emotional ap-
proach. They argue that American security will be seriously threatened by exporting 
technology to the "enemy." For support of this proposition, they cite the Vietnam War, 
the Middle East, and other hot spots around the world. 
A. second argument offered by the restrictionists is that Communism is a "moral evil," 
and that as a matter of principle the United States should not deal with Communist 
countries. 
While the expansionists generally agree that national security must be protected, they 
argue that the crucial issue is what effect America's extending or withholding trade will 
have on Communist policy. Framing the issue in this way, expansionists maintain that 
encouraging trade in nonstrategic goods will stimulate the Communist desire for a peace-
ful world and diminish any appetite for military confrontation. An American embargo 
would be ineffective. The Soviets have already indicated that they will go to other markets 
to find goods they need if the United States will not deal with them; and they will be 
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B. Problems Confronting the Businessman During Negotiations 
In the United States, domestic commerce is conducted against a 
background of private ownership and freedom of contract. Management 
is always responsible for profits, the sine qua non of private commercial 
activity. This basic environment does not exist when deals are made 
with the Soviet Union. There is no private ownership in the U.S.S.R. 
Furthermore, only a limited number of organizations are empowered by 
the State to negotiate and conclude contracts with foreign enterprises. 131 
In effect, American corporations are trading with the Soviet State. This 
unfamiliar situation poses many unique problems for the American 
businessman. To bargain effectively with the Soviets, the American 
negotiator, either corporate executive or corporate counsel, must 
understand these problems and be prepared to cope with them when 
they arise. 
1. ACCESS TO THE MARKETS 
One of the first problems that an American businessman contem-
plating trade with the Soviets encounters is a lack of information. It is 
difficult for the American exporter to determine the exact needs of his 
potential buyer. Whereas the American businessman can promote his 
product and create a market for it in the United States, normal commer-
cial promotion is virtually non-existent in the Soviet Union. Neverthe-
less opportunities do exist for Western firms to display their products 
to potential buyers. Until just recently the officially sponsored trade 
fairs and exhibitions provided the only opportunity for Americans to 
advertise their products. The Trade Agreement, however, provides that 
the United States may establish a governmentally-sponsored Commer-
cial Office in Moscow, operated through the United States Embassy 
located there. 132 Likewise, the Soviets have opened a trade office in 
Washington. Despite the fact that the Trade Agreement is not officially 
in force, the provision relating to Commercial Offices has become effec-
tive de facto. The U.S. office in Moscow will provide the U.S. business 
successful. When Ford Motor Co. was precluded by the Nixon Administration from build-
ing a car manufacturing plant in the U.S.S.R., the Soviets asked Fiat to build it for them . 
The plant , built at Togliatti , is now in full production. 
The restrictionists respond that any contribution to the Soviet economy will help their 
military capabilities. This is not true. The Soviet Union develops and maintains its 
military capability with domestic resources that are totally independent of Soviet foreign 
trade . A study of the Soviet economy clearly indicates that heavy industry, vital to 
military development, has always been the top priority of Soviet planning. The remaining 
resources are then allocated to the nonmilitary sectors of the economy . 
.See also , Hoya, supra note 7, at 32-36; McQuade, supra note 12, at 44-51. 
l :~I. See not.es 69-80 supra and accompanying text. 
132. Trade Agreement, supra note 1, art. 5. 
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community with current information on Soviet markets and facilitate 
introductions of American businessmen to the appropriate Soviet minis-
tries. In addition, bilingual stenographers, communications and expert 
advice will be available through this office. 
As important as the formation of a Commercial Office is the fact 
that business firms may have a greater opportunity to open permanent 
offices in Moscow to represent them in their Soviet transactions. 133 Be-
fore such a branch office may be opened, however, Soviet accreditation 
must be obtained. The U.S.S.R. has promised that accreditation of U.S. 
firms will be considered on a basis no less favorable than that accorded 
firms of any third country. Once accredited, the branch office receives 
many privileges. It may: employ local personnel; acquire office space 
and accompanying facilities (such as telephones, telex equipment); 
import equipment from the U.S. such as typewriters, calculators, dicta-
tion and copying equipment; receive housing (with the right to import 
such necessities as furniture and appliances, automobiles and other per-
sonal i terns). 
The assurances of facilities represent a solution to part of the access 
problem. But, a major barrier to U.S .-Soviet trade still exists in that 
most foreign companies are sealed off from direct contact with Soviet 
domestic producers and distributors. As noted above, 134 all sales or pur-
chases are handled by foreign trade organizations, intermediate State 
agencies. Consequently, the Western firms find it difficult to determine 
and meet the real needs of the potential end-user. Similarly, the Eastern 
manufacturer has at his disposal only incomplete knowledge of the vari-
ety of available capital goods or special engineering which the United 
States producer can provide in order to satisfy particular requirements. 
The Soviet FTO does not possess the requisite technical knowledge to 
make the complex decisions relevant to the purchase of a sophisticated 
product that may have to be used in conjunction with domestic parts. 135 
Because of the complex bureaucracy of the Soviet system the re-
quirements specified by the end user, when the original request is made 
to the Ministry of Foreign Trade, are often changed by the time the final 
order is placed with the foreign enterprise. Until further decentraliza-
tion of the Soviet economy occurs, this problem will persist. 136 
rn:·L COMMERCIAL AGREEMENTS, supra note 1, at 76-77. 
rn4. See notes 69-80 supra and accompanying text. 
1:35. PISAR, supra note 6, at 202-03. This is true because the trade organization is as 
much concerned with the questions of price and national balance of payments as with the 
technical refinements specified by the local customer. 
136. There are indications that such a decentralization is taking place. P1sAR, supra 
note 6, at 203. 
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2. LANGUAGE 
Language can be a barrier to effective communication. Although 
what someone said may be clear, what was meant may be something 
altogether different. Businessmen use a myriad of signs, gestures and 
expressions which convey meanings as clearly as the spoken word. 137 One 
American engineering company executive expressed his frustration in 
dealing with the Russians: "At home you can read the face of your 
customer, but the Russians were inscrutable." 138 
Language also poses a problem in the process of drafting and trans-
lating a contract. The standard contract used by "Stankoimport," an 
exporter-importer of metal cutting machine-tools and related products, 
contains a penalty clause (agreed and liquidated damages). The clause 
provides: 
In the event of any delay in delivery against the dates stipulated in the 
Contract, the Sellers pay the Buyers penalty (agreed and liquidated 
damages) at the rate of 0.5 percent of the value of the equipment over 
due for every started week within the first four weeks and 1 percent for 
every following started week thereafter. However, the total amount of 
penalty for delay is not to exceed 10 percent of the value of the equip-
ment not delivered in due time. 
If a delay in delivery occurs, the penalties in this clause may be applied. 
The language in this provision, however, poses difficult problems of 
interpretation. 
The Russian contract contains three basic price terms. The Russian 
sum ma means "total amount of the contract," calculated by adding the 
prices for all items ordered. Tsena means "price for each individual 
item." Stoimost' is used to denote the "total value of the equipment." 
Although tsena and summa are clearly specified in dollar amounts in 
the contract, the stoimost' is not defined anywhere in the agreement. 
The American negotiator must demand that a precise, specified term be 
used in the penalty clause. 1311 
1:n. Nehemkis & Schollhammer, supra note 57, at 30. 
ms. Donald .J. Morfee, Bus. WEEK, Jan. 1, 1972, at 30. 
1:m. Consider, for example, the following hypothetical: Firm A, a United States 
manufacturer, is selling Stankoimport a turn-key factory. The factory is near completion 
when a shipment of vital machinery is delayed for some unexcused reason. The question 
then becomes: what is the value (in the Russian contract a term different than "price" or 
"amount") of the equipment? Perhaps, the value is the total price of the individual parts 
as yet undelivered. If so, then why wasn't the Russian tsena used? On the other hand, 
perhaps the damages will be based on the total amount of the contract, for the delivered 
parts of the contract are of no use without the vital machinery as yet undelivered. But, if 
this interpretation was intended, the Russian summa would have been used. If the dam-
ages are not to be determined on the basis of the prices of the goods missing or on the 
total value of the contract, then what exactly does "value of the equipment" mean? If it 
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There is one other language problem worthy of mention. Should a 
dispute that cannot be settled by the parties themselves arise, they will 
undoubtedly submit to arbitration. Yet, in some agreements, no men-
tion is made of which contract, the English or Russian version, will be 
official. The best solution to this problem might be to authorize transla-
tion of the contract into some mutually agreeable third language, and 
then designate it as the official version. 140 
3. FORM OF NEGOTIATIONS 
Business negotiations with the Soviets are often lengthy, complex 
and arduous. 141 Because the Soviets prefer to shop around before com-
mitting themselves to a binding contract, the American negotiators 
must persevere and be patient. 
The monolithic character of the Soviet trading partner vests him 
with virtually unparalleled bargaining power. As noted above, 142 each 
export-import enterprise handles practically all of its country's trade in 
particular product lines. This power often manifests itself in the culmi-
nation of huge one-shot deals involving very large sums of money and 
resources. 143 This bargaining power can also be utilized to exert subtle 
pressures on American negotiators. Other departments of the govern-
ment can aid in delaying a final signing of a contract by such means as 
visa denial and travel restrictions. Pressures of this nature can be coun-
terproductive, however, and are used only when necessary as a last 
resort. 144 
Although the bargaining disparity can be more easily resisted by 
larger American firms, there are certain negotiating pressures that can-
not be avoided. The Soviets are notorious for playing competing firms 
off against one another in an effort to obtain the best over-all terms in 
an agreement. It should come as no surprise, for example, if the Soviets 
attempt to attach certain conditions that purchases or sales be insured 
by Soviet insurers and cleared through Soviet banks. Likewise, the Sovi-
ets seek certain concessions from a Western trading partner when a 
sizable purchase is involved. These may take the form of a discounted 
price as a show of "good will" or the request for a compensatory pur-
chase of local goods. 
means the losses suffered by the Soviet Union because of non-delivery, it is possible that 
not only the losses suffered by the particular Russian user would be included, but also, 
the losses suffered by Russian manufacturers who were expecting delivery of this product 
so as to incorporate them into their own production process. 
140. Problems of interpretation will remain, but they will be the same for both sides. 
141. See PISAR, supra note 6, at 210; GRIFFIN, supra note 8, at 160-64. 
14~. See notes 69-80 supra and accompanying text. 
14:L See notes 110 and Ill supra and accompanying text. 
144. PISAR, supra note 6, at 210. These pressures vary from denial of visa or travel 
restrictions to delaying the signing of a contract . 
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The attitude of the American negotiator is an important factor 
throughout the negotiations. 145 American lawyers and businessmen are 
generally reputed to be "breach-minded." In the past, American nego-
tiators have concentrated on securing a contract that adequately pro-
tects them in the event that one or both of the parties to the contract 
fails to perform. This attitude is reflected in American preoccupation 
with rights and remedies of the parties upon breach of the contract. 
The American attitude can be contrasted with that of the Soviet 
negotiator, who is generally "performance-minded." That is, the Soviets 
prefer contracts that virtually guarantee performance by both parties. 
This stark difference in approach can cause problems at the negotiating 
table. The Soviets feel that when an American businessman sits down 
to negotiate with foreign trade organization officials, he should adopt 
the attitude of the Soviets and attempt to draw a contract which une-
quivocally spells out the future performance of both parties. Little 
should be left for future determination. 
Once a contract is signed, the Soviet reputation for performance is 
impeccable. 146 They can be expected to perform to the letter of the 
contract; and they expect Americans to do the same. In view of this 
faithfully scrupulous Soviet approach to contract performance, the 
American negotiator should be absolutely certain that both parties have 
the same interpretation of all the terms and conditions of the contract. 147 
4. DELIVERY TERMS AND QUALITY CONTROL 
Soviet contracts for the purchase and sale of goods contain a num-
ber of clauses relating to delivery. These generally include: shipping 
instructions and notification of shipment; delivery dates; penalty 
(agreed and liquidated damages); inspection and test; guarantee; and 
packing and marking clauses. Most of these clauses are straightforward, 
detailed procedural instructions. Some problems do arise in relation to 
delivery, however, and the American businessman should be aware of 
them prior to performing the contract. 
When delivery via sea transportation is specified, the goods are 
generally FOB or FAS Great Lakes Ports. If air transport is contem-
plated, the delivery term will ordinarily be FOB New York. 148 Transpor-
tation costs may vary, depending on the method of delivery. Likewise, 
the passing of title and risk of accidental loss must be stipulated at the 
time the contract is negotiated. 149 Provisions for early delivery must also 
145. GIFFEN, supra note 8, at 163-64. 
146. Id. at 164. 
147. See notes 137-40 supra and accompanying text. 
148. S ee sample contracts on file at Department of Commerce. 
149. For example, a clause might read: 
All equipment outlined in this proposal will be delivered to U.S.A. port for 
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be made to insure against the goods sitting at port for two or three 
months, waiting to be transported to the final destination point. Simi-
larly, United States sellers should be certain to notify the FTO of ship-
ment within twenty-four hours of the time the goods were shipped. 
Confirmation by letter is a highly recommended procedure. 
Incorrect marking or wrong addressing can lead to additional trans-
portation and storage charges, for which the seller will ordinarily be 
responsible. All contracts call for specific markings to be made on all 
sides of the packages containing the goods. Sample labels are often 
attached to or included in the contract itself. Especially important in 
this regard is the fact that the sanctions for late delivery can be quite 
severe. 
All contracts for the sale of goods to the Soviet Union specify that 
the buyers will have the right to inspect and test the goods to be sent to 
the U.S.S.R. on the seller's premises at the seller's expense. The goods 
are inspected and tested, at a time specified by the seller, usually after 
they have been manufactured and are ready to be transported to the 
Soviet Union. If defects are discovered, the seller must eliminate them 
at his own expense, and notify the buyer when they are ready to be 
inspected and tested again. Once the goods are transported to the 
U.S.S.R., they are tested again when the entire project is constructed 
and ready to begin operation. It is at the final testing point that accept-
ance or rejection of the goods takes place. 
The guarantee clause is one of the most important provisions of 
the contract. General guarantees relating to the quality of materials and 
workmanship are incorporated in this section of the contract. Often the 
Soviets will insert a clause specifying that any improvements in technol-
ogy or technological innovations occurring during manufacture of the 
product must be turned over to the Russians so that they can make any 
alterations they deem important. This information is often sought free 
of charge. 150 If the seller offers to supply any relevant information that 
ll'ith 
shipment within 9 months after receipt of signed proposal. __ shall bear no 
responsibility for any distribution, supply, or transportation delay of any kind 
or any interference with or impairment of this contract as a result thereof where 
such delays occur after said FAS delivery, nor shall __ bear any responsibility 
for any damage of any kind arising from any early delivery. 
lf>O. Compare 
This proposal covers technical know-how only as it exists at the time of accept-
ance of the proposal and does not encompass equipment or process changes that 
may occur in the future. Such future processes and equipment, should they be 
desired, would be subject to separate arid additional agreements. 
If during the manufacture of the equipment the Sellers become aware of any 
technical improvements and/or technical innovations the Sellers shall inform 
the Buyers and hand over to them free of charge the complete technical docu-
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can improve the product after it has been placed in operation, then he 
may be able to obtain some concession on another point in the contract. 
Furthermore, this type of information may be invaluable in establishing 
a long-term, profitable relationship. 
The guarantee clause also contains provisions relating to non-
conformity of the goods. As long as the American manufacturer has 
adhered strictly to the contractual specifications, no problems will arise 
here. If the supplier has deviated from the conditions of the contract, 
however, severe penalties, including possible cancellation of the entire 
agreement, are imposed on the seller. 
5. ARBITRATION 
Arbitration is generally a last resort, to be used only if the parties 
to the contract cannot settle a dispute by other reasonable means. In 
the past, most U.S.-Soviet contracts specified that the parties would 
submit to arbitration before 
... the Foreign Trade Arbitration Commission at the U.S.S.R. Cham-
ber of Commerce and Industry in Moscow for settlement in compliance 
with the rules of procedure of the said Commission. 
Although the Soviet Foreign Trade Arbitration Commission (FTAC) has 
a reputation for fairness and impartiality, 151 the fact that it is under the 
control of the Soviet government cannot be overlooked. 
If the foreign party would not agree to arbitrate in Moscow, the 
Soviets preferred to arbitrate in Stockholm. 152 The problem with this 
compromise is that most American negotiators are not familiar with the 
Swedish procedutal rules of arbitration or Swedish substantive law. 153 
Moreover, Swedish opinions are not published, thereby adding a degree 
of uncertainty to the entire proposition. 
This problem has been partially remedied by the Trade Agreement. 
mentation if available to the Sellers, so that the Buyers could decide on expe-
diency of making necessary alterations to the technical specifications. 
The differences between these two clauses can be important if the seller is on the verge of 
a technological breakthrough. 
151. Berman, supra note 55, at 493. 
152. The American negotiator might prefer, Geneva, however: 
In case the parties are unable to arrive at an amicable settlement, all disputes 
a re to be submitted without application to the Arbitration Commission of the 
Chamber of Commerce of Switzerland in Geneva, in accordance with the Rules 
of Procedure of the said Commission. 
1 5:~ . If Swedish "choice of law" rules govern, for example, it is important to know if 
t he laws of the country where the contract was signed apply. Americans might try to 
include the following clause in the contract: 
It is the intention of the parties that the laws of the State of California, U.S .A. 
should govern the validity of this agreement, the construction of its terms, and 
the interpretation of the rights and duties of the parties. 
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The Trade Agreement encourages settlement of commercial disputes by 
arbitration under the Arbitration Rules of the Economic Commission for 
Europe, a United Nations agency, in a country other than the Soviet 
Union and the United States, with arbitrators appointed by an author-
ity of some third country. The parties to the contract, however, are free 
to decide on any other means of arbitration "which they mutually prefer 
and agree best suits their personal needs." 154 
6. FORCE MAJEURE 
The force majeure clauses included in most U.S.-Soviet contracts 
are the same. They provide for postponement of the delivery dates, but 
only 
if this non-fulfillment [of the contractual liabilities] was caused by the 
circumstances of Force Majeure, and namely, fire, flood, earthquake 
and war, provided these circumstances have directly affected the exe-
cution of the present contract. 
Americans have unsuccessfully attempted to include provisions for 
labor strikes and civil disturbances in the force majeure clauses. 155 The 
Soviets have rejected these inclusions because they are so antithetical 
to their basic ideology. 
The force majeure clauses also require notification and proof that 
the circumstances making it impossible to perform have actually oc-
curred. 
7. PRICE TERMS 
Reaching an agreement on price and credit terms is undoubtedly 
the most difficult task of the negotiating process. There are essentially 
three methods of payment in sales transactions: cash, credit, or barter. 
The principal method of payment in U.S.-Soviet short-term trade trans-
actions has been by credit. 156 However, the Soviets are not opposed to, 
and often prefer, barter transactions. 
Conventional banking and financing techniques are widely used in 
East-West trade. The Soviet desire to borrow is limited by concern over 
the trade balance and the ability to meet payment obligations at matu-
154. Trade Agreement, supra note 1, art. 7. 
155. For example: 
The parties are released from responsibility for partial or complete non-
fultillment of their liabilities under the present contract, if this non-fulfillment 
was caused by the circumstances of Force Majeure, and namely, fire, flood, 
earthquake, labor strikes, civil disturbances, war or other similar events, pro-
vided these circumstances have directly affected the execution of the present 
contract. In this case, the time of fulfillment of the contract obligations is 
extended for the period equal to that during which such circumstances last. 
156. GIFFEN, supra note 8, at 211. 
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rity. The Soviet Union, however, enjoys one of the world's finest credit 
ratings. 
Letters of credit are probably the most important device used in 
short-term credit transactions. 157 Confirmed letters of credit, backed up 
by two banks, are the most acceptable kind of credit, and should be 
sought in the negotiation process. The type of draft to be drawn is 
extremely important-either a sight draft or a time draft. Finally, the 
letter of credit will contain a list of the agreed-upon documents that 
the American party (as the seller) must present to the bank with his 
draft. Among the documents that might be requested are: detailed com-
mercial invoices, original bills of lading, original airway bills, clean dock 
receipts in the name of the FTO or its agent, packing lists, quality 
guarantee letters, test and inspection sheets, a copy of the U.S. vali-
dated export license (if required), marine insurance policy, and a state-
ment by the American trader that an original bill of lading has been 
mailed to any intermediate consignees. 158 The businessman must be 
thoroughly familiar with each of these documents prior to entering the 
negotiation process. 
The negotiator need not preoccupy himself with lengthy negotia-
tions over the types of documents that are necessary to obtain payment. 
Rather, the negotiator should bear in mind the fact that both the buyer 
and the State Bank guaranteeing payment are government owned. 
Thus, the State itself stands behind the entire contract. This factor 
tends to minimize the credit risk involved. 
Barter, the simple swapping of two commodities against an agreed 
monetary norm or standard of value, has become a standard device in 
East-West trade. This method of payment is necessary for the U.S.S.R. 
to maintain its hard currency reserves. Pure barter transactions are 
probably of little importance to the American businessman. In general, 
the commodity offered by the Soviets is an item that is of little interest 
157. PrsAR, supra note 6, at 214. 
158. For example: 
Net lump sum price of U.S. $_, such sum to be paid in the form of an 
irrevocable divisible letter of credit, opened by the Ministry of Land Improve-
ment & Water Resources, on the signing of this proposal, and payable to_ 
through _ , 
Three partial payments: 
(1) Upon signing 
(2) Delivery of equipment to harbor (U.S.) upon presentation of: 
(a) Bill of Lading 
(b) Packing List 
(c) Original Invoices 
(d) Copy of USA Export Licenses 
(:l) To be Paid upon completion of initial training or not later than 
1 year after receipt of equipment in Russia, whichever is sooner. 
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in our developed economy. 1511 
However, the barter device can be extremely useful to American 
firms that negotiate "licensing agreements" with the Soviets. Licensing 
agreements are used to transfer to the Soviets "without the right of 
return the exclusive and unlimited right to use the technology, technical 
documentation and 'know-how' relating to the production of' a particu-
lar commodity. 
V /0 Licensintorg, an FTO, was created in 1962 for the express 
purpose of buying and selling technical information in foreign mar-
kets. 160 Thus, any American corporation engaged to sell technical infor-
mation and "know-how" will deal with Licensintorg. There are a num-
ber of methods available for financing licensing agreements: cash, cash 
plus royalty, and cash plus product in kind. Pure cash payment for a 
license is usually not desirable from the American point of view. Should 
the licensee become a competitor of the licensor, or open new markets 
in an as yet undeveloped market, the licensor will lose future monies 
that could have been provided for by a royalty provision. This problem 
can be resolved in the license agreement, at the negotiation stage. 
If the firm opts for a cash payment and remuneration for future 
sales by the licensee, the problem of whether to choose cash royalties or 
a percentage of the future output of the factory arises. The decision must 
be made depending on the future needs of the licensor. If the supplier 
feels that payment in kind would be useful, then he should reject a 
cash/royalty plan. In the case of a corporation supplying technology 
needed to extract a natural resource, such as natural gas, the payment 
in kind provision, accompanied by an escalating price provision, is more 
useful. A manufacturer selling the technology used in the production of 
a particular consumer good would probably prefer payment in terms of 
a cash royalty. 
The problem of the future will be the extension of credit without 
the aid of the Export-Import Bank. 161 Although the Johnson Debt De-
fault Act will not deter normal extension of credits, 162 few, if any, Ameri-
can corporations have the necessary capital available to extend long-
term credits of the magnitude required by the large deals. Furthermore, 
American banks will probably not tie up such large sums of money for 
long periods of time at the low interest rates that are a standard part of 
long-term contracts. 163 
159. PISAR, supra note 6, at 216-17. 
160. See GIFFEN, supra note 8, at 237, 354-66 (specimen licensing agreement). 
161. See notes 122-30 supra and accompanying text. 
162. See notes 46-50 supra and accompanying text. 
16:l. The natural gas deal, for example, would involve three American firms, and the 
total amount of the deal could run between $8 billion and $10 billion. Most of the other 
deals have already been concluded involving amounts ranging from $6 million to $45 
million. 
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Compounding this problem even further is the fact that the Export-
Import Bank has a total credit exposure of only $16.5 billion, the largest 
credit to one country being $1.3 billion.164 If the Export-Import Bank is 
allowed to continue extending credit to the Soviet Union, then its poli-
cies may have to be changed to allow for the massive credits that will 
be needed. In the alternative new sources of credit will have to be devel-
oped to accommodate the long-term East-West transactions. 165 
8. OTHER PROBLEMS 
Soviet foreign trade is so intimately related to the government's 
political objectives that the American businessman sometimes 
encounters problems over which he has no control. The Soviets have 
tended to restrict foreign trade with those countries which discriminate 
against Soviet products. This foreign country's "incorrect attitude" may 
be reflected in high tariff rates on Soviet manufacturers or by adminis-
trative regulations, administra_tive and judicial practice or established 
exchange restrictions that tend to create unfavorable conditions for the 
foreign trade of the U .S.S .R. 166 The fact that the Trade Agreement was 
signed would have served to insure against this type of Soviet retaliatory 
action. But the subsequent passage by the House of H.R. 10710, with 
the "anti-Soviet" amendments, might lead the Soviets to retaliate in 
some way. The Soviet Government is continuing to negotiate and deal 
with American businessmen, at least until the Senate acts on the pro-
posed legislation. What action the Soviets will take if the Senate does 
not alter the House bill is unclear. 
CONCLUSION 
Negotiating a contract with the Russians is an arduous task. It 
takes patience and perseverance on the part of the American business-
man . The end result, however, can be extremely profitable. The key to 
achieving a profitable agreement is preparation. The American busi-
nessman must familiarize himself with the legislation and ideologies of 
both the United States and the Soviet Union. With this knowledge as a 
foundation, the American negotiator can cope with the myriad of prob-
lems that are encountered in dealing with the Russians. The most profit-
able agreements will be negotiated by the American businessman who 
For example, in the oil industry, TRW, Inc. holds a $20 million contract from Machi-
noimport, for petroleum-pumping systems. Borg-Warner Corporation has a $6 million 
order for oil -well pumps from the same FTO. U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Feb. 19, 1973, 
at 88. 
164. PETERSON, supra note 95, at 20. 
165. A U.S. corporation may negotiate a contract through a foreign subsidiary, 
t hereby gaining the benefit of loans backed by the foreign government. 
166. Berman, supra note 55, at 502-03. 
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has a thorough understanding of the problems involved in dealing with 
the Russians, and has developed solutions to those problems prior to 
entering into negotiations. This approach will also lead to a mutually 
beneficial, long-term relationship. 
David Marx, Jr. 
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